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Abstract
One of the main arguments against a public …nance solution to un-
employment is that, at least in the long run, the tax burden is passed
onto labour. This paper presents a general equilibrium model on the
relation among tax progressivity, wage setting and employment where
changes in labour taxation a¤ect the labour market equilibrium. It
is shown that the relation of interest depends on the initial level of
taxation and on the labour tax parameter allowed to vary (marginal-
average, personal income-payroll taxes). On the basis of a calibration
exercise for Italy and the US, the qualitative analysis of the model
is supported and the e¤ects are quanti…ed. In particular, larger em-
ployment e¤ects are determined by a reduction in both the average
(personal incomenpayroll) tax rates. Taking as a benchmark for our
policy experiment the actual …scal reform during the period 1978-97,
variations in the employment rate implied by our model are quite close
to those empirically observed.
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11 Introduction
The e¤ect of labour taxation on unemployment di¤erentials across countries
was one of the issues largely discussed in the mid-eighties following the Bean,
Layard and Nickell (1986) e¤ort to organise a multicountry study. According
to them, labour taxation is only partially responsible for the unsatisfactory
employment performance of European countries. Their empirical evidence
shows a negative but weak relationship between labour taxation and em-
ployment. This seems to con…rm the labour economists’ common view that
the tax burden is fully passed onto real wages.
After almost two decades, Daveri and Tabellini (2000, DT henceforth),
have put such a view into question. Inspired by some data correlations,
DT suggest that the combined e¤ect of monopolistic and decentralised trade
unions and high labour taxation can provide an explanation for the high
unemployment and slow growth of European continental countries relative
to the US and UK. In other words, labour taxation a¤ects unemployment only
in those countries where the labour market is unionised. In interpreting their
empirical results, DT primarily refer to a model of the economy characterised
by proportional labour taxation and exogenous labour supply.
Malcomson and Sartor (1987) developed the relationship between wage
determination and tax progressivity which shows that, within imperfect labour
markets, if labour taxation is progressive, following an increase in the sole
marginal tax rate, unions reduce pre-tax wages on the basis of a “union
substitution e¤ect”. This substitution e¤ect weighs the increasing wage pres-
sure in terms of the cost of foregone employment. Under the assumption of
a progressive taxation system, the post-tax wages elasticity with respect to
pre-tax wages is smaller than one. This implies that following an increase
in the marginal tax rate holding constant the average, the marginal bene-
…t of increasing the wage is reduced whereas the marginal cost is invariant.
Lockwood and Manning (1993, LM) further discuss the implications of a pro-
gressive taxation system on unions’ wage-setting behaviour. This literature
presents static, partial equilibrium models and assumes that labour supply
is exogenous. Therefore, given wage determination, it derives employment
e¤ects as residual from the labour demand.
More recently, a number of papers have considered the implications of
tax progressivity on wage setting and employment when labour supply is
endogenous. Holmlund and Kolm (1995), Calmfors (1995), Fuest and Huber
(2000) and Hansen, Pedersen and Sløk (1999) show that, with an endogenous
labour supply, a sole increase in the marginal tax rate has also a “labour
supply income e¤ect” that may result in increasing wage pressure given the
lower incentive to supply labour services. In particular, Aronsson, Löfgren
2and Sjögren (1999), by developing a dynamic general equilibrium model with
in…nitely lived agents, show that an increase in the sole marginal tax rate
leads to a higher real wage and to a lower employment rate.
This present paper considers a general equilibrium, overlapping gener-
ations (OLG) model in which labour supply is endogenous and the labour
market is not competitive. This paper aims at analysing the e¤ects of pro-
gressive labour taxation on wage determination and employment by focusing
on the role played by each of the four relevant tax parameters of a progressive
taxation system (namely, marginal and average rates related to personal in-
come and payroll taxation systems). Determining the role played by each of
the four labour tax parameters is an important issue as long as actual …scal
reforms involve contemporaneous changes in marginal and average tax rates.
For example, as shown by Wagsta¤ et al (1999) in several OECD countries,
…scal reforms on personal income taxes have often led to fewer brackets (e.g.
lower marginal rates) and lower average rates.
Moreover, it is largely recognised that payroll taxes may a¤ect employ-
ment (see for example Kolm (1999), to name but one). According to LM,
agents’ optimising behaviour implies that marginal and average personal in-
come tax rates in‡uence employment in the same manner as marginal and
average payroll taxes. This paper will show that if labour supply is endoge-
nous this is not necessarily true. Indeed, labour supply is independent of
payroll taxes, whereas it is not of personal income taxes.
Although some of these questions have already been analysed, the answers
provided by the current literature are quite controversial. By providing both
qualitative and quantitative analyses, this paper assesses the robustness of
existing propositions in an OLG general equilibrium framework that has not
been previously used to address the tax progressivity issue. Furthermore,
moving from a partial to a general equilibrium framework, this paper will
point to the importance of the “interest rate e¤ect” and its strict dependency
on the OLG structure of the model. Following a tax shock, intertemporal
decisions of individuals change as well as their opportunity cost, the real
interest rate. As long as the real interest rate changes, …rms modify their
decisions on the input choices. This kind of transmission mechanism can
also be found in a Ramsey type model. However, in contrast to a Ramsey
model where the net of tax real interest rate is determined by the households’
preferences, within an OLG framework the Euler equation states that the real
interest rate is a function of the ratio between old and young consumption
as well as the discount factor.1 The importance of the supply of capital as a
1Given the speci…c assumption of a CRRA utility function, the ratio between old and
young consumption enters non linearly in the Euler equation.
3leading mechanism is therefore straightforward.
Thereby, this paper will focus on the interactions among three main trans-
mission mechanisms: a “union substitution e¤ect,” a “labour supply income
e¤ect” and an “interest rate e¤ect”. This paper extends the DT paper by
introducing a progressive taxation system and it extends all the previous
static partial equilibrium analyses such as LM. Furthermore, this paper ex-
tends both by endogenising labour supply. It also generalises Aronsson et
al. (1999), by considering the employment e¤ects of all labour tax shocks
and by quanti…yng these e¤ects.2 Finally, the current paper will show that
the policy used for changing tax progressivity matters for the …nal e¤ects on
equilibrium wages and employment.
Since the qualitative analysis of the model seems to suggest that wage
and employment e¤ects of progressive taxation are likely to be ambiguous, we
ran some policy experiments for two countries, Italy and the USA, in order
to determine their direction and quantify their size. Italy was chosen since it
is characterised by the presence of strong unions and a high unemployment
rate, and it is meant to represent a typical European Continental country.
The USA, given their low-unemployment experience and their tradition of
weaker unions represent the Anglo-Saxon group.3
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the basic
model. Section 3 describes the equilibrium solution. Section 4 illustrates the
qualitative e¤ects of progressive taxation on wage setting and employment.
Section 5 reports the calibration and section 6 the policy experiments. Finally
some conclusions follow.
2 The Economy
Consider a closed economy characterised by two periods overlapping genera-
tions and composed of four main economic agents: households, unions, …rms
and the government. Population is constant, there is no altruism, individuals
earn only wage income when young and capital income when old. At the end
of the …rst period individuals retire.
2As Aronsson et al. (1999) point out, their results are consistent only with an increase
in the marginal tax rate holding the average tax rate constant.
3The Anglo-Saxon countries and in particular the USA are largely recognised as coun-
tries where labour market is almost competitive. However, empirical evidence of the
presence of non-competitive forces can be found in papers such as Brunello and Wadhwani
(1989) and Holmlund and Zetterberg (1991) where the estimates of the insider weight is
quite high for US (0.3).
42.1 Household
Economic agents have homothetic preferences described by an intertemporal
Constant Relative Risk Aversion utility function, separable over consumption
and hours of work when the individual is young and employed and over



























where \i = e(employed); u(unemployed)"; \y" and \o" stands for
young and old respectively; the second term takes the value of zero if the
individual is unemployed; ¯ is a discount factor which is as usual less than
j1jand that can be positive or negative according to the weight on the two
periods given by the household; cy denotes household consumption when
young and co when old; gy and go represent government consumption in the
two generations; µ > 0 and ' > 0 measure respectively the households’ atti-
tude to substitute consumption between the two periods and the individual’s
evaluation of leisure; …nally 1
°¡1 (° > 1) is the elasticity of marginal disutility























and wh¡T(wh;z) is the income of workers net of taxes; b denotes unem-
ployment subsidies, r is the rate of return on capital, and …nally si indicates
the individual savings. Following LM, T(wh;z) labels the personal labour
income taxes, z is a vector of parameters (marginal tax rates, tax band...)
which takes into account any non-linearities within the tax system. Un-
employment subsidies are determined by some political-economy mechanism
4This speci…cation generalises the cases of a log-linear utility function where µ is equal
to 1 (e.g. Holmlund and Kolm (1995)) and a linear utility function where µ is equal to 0
(e.g. Sørensen (1997b)). Further, it examines the relationship between the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution and changes in labour taxation.
5outside the model and are not taxable by assumption.5 Combining (2.1.2)
and (2.1.3), through a standard utility maximisation procedure, it is possible






































µ . We introduce the parameter º; suggested
by Musgrave and Musgrave (1976), which measures the personal income tax
progressivity and corresponds to the value of (1 ¡ ¿)=(1 ¡ t), given that ¿
and t represent respectively the marginal and the average personal income
tax rates. It should be noted that º is inversely related to tax progressivity.6
Finally, given the budget constraint and under the assumption of full capital
depreciation, savings of the young at time t set the capital stock at time
t+1 that, combined with the labour supplied by the next young generation,
produces output at time t + 1.7 Hence, savings depend on the income net
of taxes, the return on savings, the discount factor and the elasticity of
substitution between consumption.8
5If unemployment bene…ts are assumed taxable, then changes in the parameter z of the
taxation system would a¤ect the marginal and average rate of the bene…ts’ brackets. Then,
in evaluating the e¤ect of changes in taxation on wages one should also consider this e¤ect.
However, since bene…ts are conceived as unemployment bene…ts only and since individuals
can not earn other income rather than wages, it is quite likely that unemployment bene…ts
would be below the threshold and therefore untaxed.
6The parameter º is well-known in the literature as the coe¢cient of residual income
progression and it corresponds to the elasticity of the after-tax wage with respect to an
increase in the pre-tax wage.
7Full capital depreciation is not a strong assumption given that our model considers
just two periods.
8This is strictly related to the functional form assumption of the utility function.
62.2 Firms
There exists a measure one identical competitive …rms indexed by j. Their







Let’s de…ne l, the labour input, as the number of workers times the hours
of work.9 Since the goods market is competitive, the …rms’ optimisation
problem consists of maximising the following pro…t function:
max
lj;kj
¼j = yj ¡ lj(wj + D(wj;z
0)) ¡ rkj (2.2.2)
where D(wj;z0) represents the payroll taxes and z0 is a vector of param-
eters of the payroll tax system. Labour demand can thus be obtained by









Finally, since capital markets are competitive, for the …rst order condition
with respect to capital, the equilibrium rate of return on capital is equal to








The aim of the government is to keep the following budget constraint bal-
anced:
twhN + dwhN = (1 ¡ N)b + G (2.3.1)
where d stands for average payroll tax rate and G represents government
consumption. The balanced budget constraint (2.3.1) is guaranteed by the
condition that changes in public consumption counterbalance the changes of
tax rates.10
9That is, workers and hours of work are perfect substitutes in production.
10To simplify the exposition, indirect taxation (e.g. VAT), is not taken into account
72.4 Unions
The labour market is characterised by the presence of monopolistic unions
at …rm level which set wages. Since output prices are normalised to unity,
setting nominal (pre-tax) wages is equivalent to setting real wages. Unions
are unable to a¤ect …scal policy decisions and their aim is to maximise the
expected utility of members subject to the labour demand (2.2.3) and house-
hold hours supply function (2.1.4). Note that an interior solution to the
maximisation problem is guaranteed by the presence of some unemployed












Following LM, it is possible to obtain an explicit solution for (2.4.1):
(wh(1 ¡ t))j = bM (2.4.2)
The post-tax real wage (wh(1 ¡ t)) is an increasing function of the unem-
ployment bene…t (b) and union markup (M). Two things are worth noting.
First, given that
(wh(1¡t))j
b = M and since union markup is higher than 1, the
post-tax real wage is higher than the unemployment bene…ts and changes
in union markup imply changes in the ratio between the post-tax wage and
the altenative wage.11 Further, union markup is increasing in º. That is,
a higher marginal tax rate, keeping the average tax rate constant, reduces
the marginal bene…t of increasing the pre-tax wage, whereas the marginal
cost is invariant. This raises the cost in terms of foregone employment of
an increase in the post-tax wage and produces the well known substitution
e¤ect which reduces wage pressure. Secondly, union markup with respect to













for two main reasons. Firstly, each …rm produces an identical good and prices are taken
as given. Secondly, they are proportional and therefore their coe¢cient of progression is
equal to 1. This implies that their changes do not a¤ect unions’ markup. Further, it is
assumed that capital income is not taxable.
11Unemployment bene…ts can be conceived as equal to the competitive wage.
12Union markup with respect to personal income taxes is slightly di¤erent since some
other parameters that enter into the hours supply function should be included.
8where Â(µ;¯;r) is de…ned as 1¡µ
(1+»)1¡µ (1 + ¹(r))











µ and º¤ corresponds to the product of º and e º: The latter param-
eter,
»
º; measures the payroll tax progressivity and corresponds to the ratio
[(1 + d)=(1 + ±)] where d and ± denotes the average and marginal payroll
tax rate respectively. De…ning the labour cost as LC = w + D(w),
»
º cor-
responds to the inverse of the elasticity of labour cost. Though unions care
about post-tax wages, they set pre-tax wages. Rearranging equation (2.4.2),





According to equation (2.4.4), pre-tax wage is an increasing function of
unemployment bene…ts and union markup but it is decreasing in hours of
work. That is, labour supply endogenisation introduces an income e¤ect
according to which it is no longer possible to identify a “pure” substitution
e¤ect on wage determination. In symmetric equilibrium, the …rm speci…c
wage and labour demand are equal to the aggregate ones. Henceforth, the
subscript \j" is then omitted.
3 The Equilibrium
The equilibrium condition in the goods market is given by:
Kt+1 = St (3.1.1)
where Kt+1 indicates the economy’s capital stock at time t + 1 and St
denotes the savings of the economy. Equation (3.1.1) states that investments
are equal to net savings given the hypothesis of full capital depreciation. The
expression for savings is then the following:
S = ns




wh(1 ¡ t)(n + (1 ¡ n)¾) (3.1.2)
where n represents the proportion of young employed within the labour
force and ¾ denotes the replacement ratio which is assumed to be a function










wh(1 ¡ t)[n + (1 ¡ n)¾] (3.1.3)
The stock of capital at time t+1 depends on the marginal propensity
to save, the post-tax wage and the employment rate. Within the labour
market, the equilibrium level of employment N* can be derived combining the
aggregate wage equation (2.4.4)and the aggregate labour demanddetermined





®(1 + d)wh ¡ (1 ¡ ®)r (se ¡ su)
(3.1.4)
All these results allow standard interpretations. Thereby, the economy’s
equilibrium is determined by all the following conditions:
1) The individual quantities (cit;kit;ht) are derived from the representa-
tive agent optimisation problem given (rt;wt;bt);
2) The real interest rate rt is equal to the marginal product of capital
from the …rm’s optimisation problem;
3) The wage at …rm level (wjt) is set by the decentralised trade unions’
optimisation problem given (rt;nt;ct;bt;ht);
4) Employment at …rm level njt is set by the representative …rm given
(rt;wt;bt);
5) The goods market and the capital market clear;
6) The government budget constraint is satis…ed;
7) The consistency condition guarantees that cit = ct; kit = kt, hit = ht
and wjt = wt
4 The qualitative analysis.
The purpose of this section is to analyse the e¤ect of changes in each of the
four labour tax parameters of interest on wage setting and employment.14
13To be more precise, note that this refers to the aggregate version of equations (2.4.4)
and (2.2.3).
14Henceforth, except when explicitly stated, each rise in tax rates is allowed keeping
constant all the others tax parameters.
104.1 Tax progressivity and wage determination.
Proposition 1 The e¤ect on wage determination of a rise in marginal per-
sonal income tax rate depends on a “union substitution e¤ect” and on a
“labour supply income e¤ect.” A higher average personal income tax rate
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1¡t and ´w;t = t
1¡t where µ
µ+¯¡1 < 1:

















on wage determination. Then, the sign of the above total di¤erential is
ambiguous and depends on the larger of the two e¤ects. This result can
not be conceived as properly novel since the implications of an endogenous
labour supply have already been a matter of concern of other papers. (cfr.
Fuest and Huber (2000) and Hansen et al (1999)). Note that since some
union members are unemployed, unambiguously we still obtain a “union
substitution e¤ect” despite of the presence in the union markup of some
labour supply parameters.15
According to equation (4.1.2), since µ
µ+¯¡1 is less than one, unions’ at-
tempt to protect wages from the taxation increase dominates the opposite
e¤ect due to changes in hours worked. Nevertheless, this counterbalancing
labour supply e¤ect appears to be a good reason to cast some doubts on
LM’s result of a more than 100% wage shift.16 This means, that the burden
15Unions’ behaviour in the wage process is independent of how they weigh employment.
However, if some members are unemployed, they have even more incentive to substitute
lower wage for employment. Note that, a higher proportion of unemployed, implies a
higher equilibrium wage over the competitive wage, then a higher union markup, a lower
income e¤ect, since wage is higher, or, the other way round, a higher substitution e¤ect.
16The more than 100% shift is due to the combined e¤ect of a complete pre-tax wage
recovery from the increase in taxation and a further increase triggered by the union markup
variation.
11of labour taxation is not shifted completely onto …rms even though unions
have monopolistic power. The amount of tax burden transferred to …rms de-





and on the worked hours elasticity





. Hence, following a rise in the
average personal income tax rate, the monopolistic union increases the wage
pressure as suggested by DT but the strength of this claim does not depend
on unions’ power but on the initial taxation level. If the taxation level is
extremely high, a further increase in the tax rate implies an heavy cost for
the workers, thus the compensating rise in the wage would be higher than
what required for a lower initial taxation level.
Proposition 2 An increase in the marginal (average) payroll tax rate lowers
(increases) the real wage if and only if µ < 1:
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According to all the above equations, payroll taxes could a¤ect wage
setting di¤erently from personal income taxes. This result contrasts what
suggested by LM. First, payroll taxes do not have any direct e¤ect on labour
supply and wage variations depend only on union markup changes.17 Sec-
ondly, how individuals discount future consumption is quite relevant. Unions
17This result is exactly that shown by LM.
12weigh the cost of foregone employment on the basis of the intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution between consumption.18
Consider for example the case µ > 1: Under this assumption, following
an increase in the marginal payroll tax rate, unions raise their wage claim (cfr
(4.1.5)). Since the average rate is held constant, the labour demand is unaf-
fected.19 Thus, the marginal cost is invariant whereas the marginal bene…t
of changing the wage is positive because individuals have strong preferences
for consuming today rather than tomorrow.
Assuming an increase in the average rate, keeping constant the marginal
rate, implies a real wage reduction because the marginal cost of a rise in
the wage is higher than the marginal bene…t (cfr (4.1.6)). Hence, if unions
ask for a higher wage, a relatively small fraction of union members would be
better o¤ since their preferences of consuming more today would be satis…ed
but many others would become unemployed.
4.2 Tax progressivity and employment
Proposition 3 Employment e¤ects of changes in personal income taxes de-
pend on an “interest rate e¤ect” and a “union substitution e¤ect.” An in-
crease in the marginal personal income tax rate implies higher employment
if and only if the “union substitution e¤ect”dominates the “income labour
supply e¤ect” on wage determination. An increase in the average personal
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depends on the value taken by the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
between consumption (µ 7 1): If µ = 1 (log-linear utility function), this elasticity is equal
to zero.
19Note that the average payroll tax rate enters into the labour demand and thus it is
often conceived as a sort of hiring cost.
13All three transmission channels of our interest can be identi…ed in equa-






. It is clear that this latter e¤ect, due to the general equilibrium
framework, is novel to all the partial equilibrium literature. Being the user
cost of capital, at a given wage, the real interest rate in‡uences the …rms’
decisions on the input choices. Furthermore, the real interest rate in‡uences
the labour market also through the hours supply of work since it changes the
opportunity cost of working today. The sign of @r











on wage determination. In particular, note that a novel implication of (4.2.1)





this kind of change
in taxation may end up in a positive correlation between changes in real wage
and changes in employment.20 We can then conceive a change in tax progres-
sivity that increases both wages and employment. This is, for example, as
can be observed in a Scandinavian country like Norway where the correlation
between changes in real wages and employment for the period 1978-1997 is











Under the same assumption, an increase in the average personal income






















work in the same direction
determining lower employment. Though, because of the endogenous labour
supply, the wage pressure is lower than 100% and the impact on employment
could be weaker than what expected by LM or it could be stronger because
of the presence of the interest rate e¤ect.
Proposition 4 An increase in the marginal (average) payroll tax rate de-



















































if µ < 1
20Note that a positive correlation between changes in wages and employment can hardly
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Following a change in payroll taxes there is not a “labour income supply


































work in the same direction. Thereby, an increase in the marginal (average)
payroll tax rate ends up in higher (lower) employment. Changes in the av-
erage payroll tax rates di¤er from those related to marginal rates since the





, which reinforces the previous
two. Finally, the magnitude of the employment e¤ect depends on the initial
taxation level.21
Table 1 summarises the basic results.
Table 1
Summary of the basic qualitative results:
Personal Income Payroll
¿ t ± d
µ < 1 µ > 1 µ < 1 µ > 1
w "# " # " " #
n "# # " "# # "#
We conclude that from a qualitative point of view, only after a change
in the average personal income tax rate, keeping constant all the other tax
rates, we are able to identify unambiguously the sign of the e¤ect on wages
and employment.
5 The Quantitative Analysis
5.1 Calibration
The calibration procedure o¤ers two main advantages. The …rst is to solve
numerically the model which does not present a closed form solution for all
the steady state equations. The second is to establish the direction and
quantify the e¤ects of changes in the tax parameters of our interest through
the identi…cation of all the deep parameters.
21This statement can easily be proved by showing that the elasticity of employment
with respect to average payroll tax rate is equal to d
1+d .
15The model described in the previous sections is characterised by 10 pa-
rameters (µ;';¯;b;®;°;¿;t;±;d) of which the four tax parameters (¿;t;±;d)
are taken from independent data source and all the others are calibrated
from the model’s steady state equations. Before describing the calibration
procedure in details, it is worth introducing the two countries over which we
carried out our policy experiments: Italy and the US. The choice is made
aiming at comparing a European Continental country such as Italy with
an Anglo-Saxon country with a low unemployment experience like the US.
Moreover, this choice allows us to focus on the role played by unions and to
investigate quantitatively the DT hypothesis of strong unions able to shift the
tax burden onto …rms. In fact, the two countries of interest are characterised
by the presence of unions whose strength is quite di¤erent. In particular,
they are both decentralised but Italian unions are traditionally stronger.
We start by setting the period equal to 20 years and by assuming that
the following expressions hold within the data Ykp = (r + ±kp)Kp; Ykd =
(r + ±kd)Kd; and Ykg = (r + ±kg)Kg; where r denotes the real interest
rate, ± represents the capital depreciation rate which is equal to 0.025 per
quarter, Kp; Kd and Kg denote respectively the sum of gross …xed capital
formation and inventories stock, consumption of private and public durable
goods.22 Country speci…c real interest rate is calculated from Fisher’s identity
(r ´ i ¡ ¼e) where the expected in‡ation is set equal to a …ve-year average
of lagged in‡ation. Data are provided by the Bank of Italy and the Federal
Reserve. The capital share, ®; is then calibrated according to the following
expression:
® =
Ykp + Ykd + Ykg
GNP + Ykd + Ykg
(5.1.1)
On the basis of (5:1:1) we obtain that for Italy the capital share is equal
to 0.36 while for US the parameter takes the value of 0.33. These two values
are consistent with observed data according to which during the last decades
the capital share has been higher in the European Continental countries than
in the Anglo-Saxon group.
The parameter µ; the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution for consumption, is an important parameter. The value refers to
that suggested by Attanasio and Jappelli (1998) on the basis of Attanasio
and Weber’s (1993) estimates of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
22A 2.5% per quarter depreciation rate is consistent with the assumption of full capital
depreciation in steady state. If one considers that it takes 20 years (the number of years
for which a generation lasts) to the economy to move from one to another steady state,
the above assumption implies that capital is completely depreciated after 10 years.
16(0.8). Thus, µ is set equal to 1.25 for both countries. Given a value for µ, we









where the ratio between old and young people’s consumption is equal
to 0.92 and 0.69 for Italy and US respectively.23 The latter derives from
Pencavel’s estimates of worked hours elasticity with respect to a wage rate:
"h =
1 ¡ µ
µ + ° ¡ 1
= ¡0:094 (5.1.3)
It should be noted that in both cases the condition that ° might be higher
than unity holds. Taking the tax parameter t from the data, the parameter
b is instead calibrated from the identity:
b ´ ¾wh(1 ¡ t) (5.1.4)
where the replacement ratio value, ¾; corresponds to the inverse of the
union markup as implied by the theoretical model and the hours of work
proportion over total hours is constructed from the data.24 The average
weekly hours of work in the manufacturing sector (1978-97) is divided to 96
hours (e.g. 16 hours times 6 working days). Moreover, as implied by the







where real interest rate and the ratio K=L values are taken from the
data while the capital share is equal to the calibrated values, 0.36 and 0.33.
Finally, given µ;b;° and M, the parameter ' is calibrated from the FOC for
the hours of work in the utility maximisation process, that is:
23The value for Italy is calculated from data reported by Jappelli and Modigliani (1999).
Data refers to repeated cross-sections (1984-1995) based on the Bank of Italy’s Survey
of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW). The ratio for the US is obtained using cross-
sectional data (1987-1998) relative to Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) by the Bureau
of Labour Statics.
24Eurostat and Bureau of Labour Statistics provide the data.
17' = º (bM)
1¡µ (1 + ¹)µ
h° (5.1.6)
Table 2 summarises the calibration:
Table 2
Calibration Summary
Country ® ° ¯ µ ' b
Italy 0.36 2.41 0.87 1.25 22.04 0.34
USA 0.33 2.41 0.61 1.25 24.07 0.32
Table 3 instead shows the tax parameters that are taken from independent
data sources. The tax rates refer to those burdened onto a single income cou-
ple, earning an average wage in the manufacturing sector, with two children
and onto his employer.
Table 3
Tax Parameters
Country ¿ t ± d º
»
º º¤
Italy 0.28 0.15 0.48 0.44 0.85 0.98 0.83
USA 0.34 0.20 0.08 0.26 0.82 1.17 0.96
Note that the personal income taxes are higher in the US where this
taxation system is also more progressive. In contrast, payroll tax rates are
much higher in Italy and the Italian payroll taxation system is progressive
whereas the American one is regressive.25 Illustrated by Table 4 are the two
countries’ steady state characteristics implied by the calibration procedure.
Table 4








y r M u
Italy 0.21 0.19 0.94 0.51 0.18 0.23 0.21 0.27 0.06 1.15 10%
USA 0.22 0.15 0.71 0.54 0.15 0.21 0.17 0.25 0.05 1.13 6%
Note:All Variables are normalised by the labour force
25Further evidence that the personal income tax system is more progressive in the USA
rather than Italy can be found in Wagsta¤ et al (1999). In their paper progressivity refers
only to the personal income taxes and it is measured, using di¤erent data sources, by the
Kakwani index.
18where \u" stands for unemployment rate. Note that in order to be able
to express our employment e¤ects in terms of the unemployment rate we
conceive the employment rate as the ratio between employment and labour
force. This can not be regarded as a strong assumption since in our model
the whole population is allowed to participate. Results presented in Table 4
are quite consistent with some empirical characteristics of the two countries.
For example, Italy presents a higher savings rate, a higher real interest rate,
a higher union markup and a higher government expenditure ratio.
5.2 Policy Experiments
Before describing our policy experiments, it is worth looking at the actual
labour tax variations in Italy and US during the period 1978-1997 to have a
more precise idea on the empirical relevance of our model.
Table 5
Labour Tax and Unemployment Changes (1978 ¡ 97)
Country %t %¿ %d %± %º %
»
º %º¤ %u
Italy 19.3 3.99 0.15 0.16 -0.33 0.1 -0.21 7.8
USA 0.65 2.61 1.06 1.59 -1.00 0.13 -0.65 1.19
According to Table 5, personal income taxes changes have been larger in
Italy than the US, though the increase in the progressivity of this taxation
system is bigger in the US (j %ºus j>j %ºit j). In both countries the pay-
roll tax systems seem to be quite unchanged. Our policy experiments will
help to shed some light on the single and combined e¤ect of labour tax rate
changes in the two economies. A di¤erent set of policy experiments is run
for both countries. Initially, aiming at quantifying the single e¤ect of labour
tax parameters on wages and employment, each of them is allowed to vary
keeping constant all the others. After that, we will take as a benchmark tax
changes illustrated in Table 5.26 Note that, since these policy experiments are
meant to be a comparison between di¤erent steady state equilibria, we focus
only on the long-run implications of changes in taxation without considering
short-run and transitional dynamics.27;28
26We also ran some experiments where the restriction of a constant overall level of
tax progressivity is imposed. Under this assumption the employment e¤ects are quite
neglible. This is consistent with our …ndings of di¤erent e¤ects associated to di¤erent tax
parameters and the importance of changing tax progressivity. Then, for ease of exposition
these results are not reported but are available upon request.
27This seems not to be a strong limit of the calibration with regard to the theoretical
model given that there exists only two overlapping generations.
28Note further, it is like saying that changes in taxation are permanent.
195.2.1 Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate E¤ects
Figure A1, reported in the appendix, illustrates the implications for Italy
and US of the sole change in marginal personal income tax rates.29 For both
countries changes in ¿ are always positively correlated to changes in wages.
This suggests that the “labour supply income e¤ect” always dominates “the
union substitution e¤ect”. The size of the …nal e¤ect on wages appears to
be strongly related to the initial taxation level. Indeed, the wage variation
is larger in the US (-0.14% against -0.10% for Italy when we impose a 1%
reduction in ¿) where the actual marginal tax rate and the personal income
tax progressivity are higher.30
Figure A1 shows further that the interest rate e¤ect is stronger than the
union substitution e¤ect leading to a negative correlation between ¿ and em-
ployment even though union markup is decreasing in ¿. As expected, the
coe¢cient is bigger for the US where the initial level of taxation is higher.
Note that the presence of this general equilibrium mechanism is quite impor-
tant since the union substitution e¤ect alone does not appear to be strong
enough to suggest this kind of …scal reform as a solution to unemployment
(e.g. 0.05% for Italy and 0.07% for US following a 1% reduction in ¿). By
a¤ecting intertemporal decisions of individuals, it appears that labour taxa-
tion could be harmful to capital accumulation as much as capital taxation.
Table A1 provides more evidence in this regard. For both countries changes
in ¿ are negatively correlated to changes in consumption, savings, real inter-
est rate and government expenditures. Two main points are worth noting
here. First, because of the increase in the employment rate, even though the
marginal tax rate is lower, government expenditure is increasing since total
tax revenues are rising. Secondly, identifying aggregate private output as the
sum of consumption and savings, the above results seem to imply that a lower
tax progressivity (¿ #) determines higher employment and output. Though
the e¤ect on employment is somehow controversial to the majority of the pa-
pers within the literature, the e¤ect on output is not surprising to the most.
Many argue that higher tax progressivity (¿ ") disincentives human capital
accumulation. What is novel here is that it appears to disincentivate capital
accumulation as well.
5.2.2 Average Personal Income Tax Rate E¤ects.
Figure A2 shows that, consistently with Proposition 1, a decrease in the
average personal income tax rate triggers a wage reduction and a rise in the
29Henceforth all tables and …gures can be found in the appendix.
30See Table A1 for more details.
20employment rate. More speci…cally, a 1% decrease in t yields to an increase
in the employment rate equal to 0.4% and 0.6% for Italy and the US. Three
things deserve to be noted. First, reducing both personal income tax rates
has a positive e¤ect on employment, though it is stronger when determined
by a reduction in the average tax rate.31 Secondly, this policy experiment
provides further evidence that what mostly matters for the size of the e¤ect
is the initial taxation level. Thirdly, it is illuminating to understanding the
role played by the real interest rate. In particular, the US case is quite
interesting where, independently of decreasing or increasing the tax rate, the
e¤ect on consumption, savings and private output is negative. Table A2 can
shed some light on this. For both countries, the relation between the real
interest rate and t is negative triggering a higher employment rate. However,
since the impact on wages and hours worked is stronger in the US because
of a higher initial taxation level, these latter e¤ects are strong enough to
determine a fall down in consumption and savings despite of the interest rate
and the employment rate are increasing. Note that this negative e¤ect on
consumption, savings and private output diminishes as the reduction in t is
bigger due to the increase in the employment rate. This implies that under
this policy experiment, the more progressive the taxation system becomes
the less the negative impact on output.32 In contrast, in Italy the combined
e¤ect of a higher interest rate and employment rate leads to a slight increase
in consumption and savings. Thereby, the new steady state is associated to
a somewhat higher output level.
5.2.3 Marginal Payroll Tax Rate E¤ects
As expected from Proposition 2, since µ > 1; changes in marginal payroll
tax rate, illustrated in Figure A3, are positively correlated to changes in
union markup and wages for both countries. Provided that ± does not in‡u-
ence worked hours, variations in wages depend entirely on changes in union
markup.33 Yet these two e¤ects are very small and almost identical and they
are stronger in Italy where the initial level of taxation is higher. Further-
more, in Italy variations of the employment rate seem primarily to re‡ect
changes in wages whereas in the US they do not. We can be more precise
by looking at Table A3 according to which there is a strong link between
31Note that a decrease in t (¿) implies a higher (smaller) degree in tax progressivity.
32Note that in the previous policy experiment an increase in tax progressivity (e.g. a
rise in the marginal personal income tax rate) leads always to a lower output level. In
contrast, a higher degree of tax progressivity achieved by decreasing the average tax rate
does (may) not have this negative e¤ect in Italy (in the US).
33Table A3 shows that changes in hours of work are very close to zero.
21savings, consumption and payroll taxes.34 While in Italy consumption and
savings’ changes are quite small, in the US they are large enough to deter-
mine a relatively large negative e¤ect on private output. This negative e¤ect
is stronger when associated to an increase in the tax rate (e.g. when the
payroll progressivity increases). Nevertheless, changes ± a¤ect positively the
employment rate for a reduction of the tax rate higher than 1%. This is
due to the fact that the increase in the real interest rate and the reduction
in wages lead …rms to substitute capital for labour. Note however that for
both countries, the gains in terms of employment are so small to suggest that
pure changes in marginal payroll taxes can not represent a policy solution to
unemployment.
5.2.4 Average Payroll Tax Rate E¤ects
Figure A4 describes the role played by changes in the average payroll taxes.
For both countries the e¤ect of changes in wages can not help much to ac-
count for changes in the employment rate. In Italy when we allow for a
reduction in d the increase in union markup is almost identical to wage
changes. Both of them are much lower than the employment rate e¤ect. Av-
erage payroll taxes enter into the labour demand as a labour cost and for this
reason they can be conceived as a sort of hiring cost. Then, it seems quite
obvious that employment increases as long as d decreases (payroll tax pro-
gressivity increases).35 Though at a …rst look the e¤ect appears to be quite
strong (0.83 employment elasticity for Italy whereas it is smaller (0.57) for
the US), employment increases less than the reduction in labour cost. That
is, …rms are not translating completely lower labour cost into employment.
Note that this policy experiment supports further the highly robust result
that stronger employment e¤ects are associated to a higher initial taxation
level. Moreover, in Italy the reduction in d is combined with an increase in
private output. In contrast, in the US the e¤ect on private output is neg-
ative. Figure A5 summarises for both countries all the previous results by
comparing the di¤erent e¤ects on wages and employment of changes in the
34This strong link in particular emerges if one compares the e¤ect on consumption and
savings to the e¤ects on all the other macroeconomic variables.
35In a model where it is allowed for …rms’ heterogeneity, we can interpret the positive
e¤ect of increasing payroll tax progressivity in another way. It favours small …rms by
reducing their hiring costs more than those sustained by big ones. Small …rms are those
which might require a higher product demand for hiring new labour. Thereby, increasing
payroll tax progressivity lowers the level of product demand necessary to small …rm to
hire more work and on average it implies higher employment. A similar argument is
sustained by Kolm (1999) who argues that imposing di¤erent payroll taxes on di¤erent
sectors implies higher employment.
22four tax parameters. Two things are worth noting. First, changes in the
employment rate are much larger than those related to wages. Secondly, the
higher the initial taxation level, the stronger the employment e¤ect.
Finally, we consider as a benchmark for the last policy experiment the
actual tax variations reported in Table 5.36;37 We obtain that according to
our model in Italy the employment (unemployment) rate should be reduced
(increased) by 7.9% whereas in US it should decrease (increase) by 2.32%.
By looking at the same Table these rates of changes are quite close to the real
ones. This seems to suggest that our model describes the relation between
labour tax progressivity and employment.
6 Conclusions
This paper has presented a general equilibrium model on the relation among
tax progressivity, wage setting and employment which distinguishes between
the implications of changes in the degree of personal income and payroll tax
progressivity. Furthermore, this current paper has pointed to the importance
of the e¤ects of each of the four types of labour taxes which de…ne the two
indices of tax progression. From a theoretical point of view three main con-
clusions can be derived. First, a general equilibrium framework introduces
another e¤ect, the “interest rate e¤ect”. This latter e¤ect can generate em-
ployment changes which are quite di¤erent from those related to real wages.
Then, it would be interesting to analyse whether this result would hold in
a small open economy where the real interest rate has to be taken as given.
This is forwarded to future research. Secondly, the role played by the labour
supply is crucial in determining the size and the sign of the e¤ect of changes
in personal income taxation over wage setting and cancels out the hypothesis
that given individuals’ rational behaviour, personal income taxes and payroll
taxes a¤ect wage determination in the same manner. Thirdly, employment
e¤ects depend on the initial taxation level: the higher the tax level, the
stronger the e¤ect. Some of these points address the question of whether
unions are able to shift the tax burden onto …rms. According to our policy
experiments, that were run through a calibration approach, the answer is no.
Union markup variations can not help to account for employment changes.
36This kind of policy experiment allow us to assess the robustness of our result in
presence of simultaneous changes in the four tax parameters.
37Note further that we …nd positive employment e¤ects (0.41% and 0.58% for Italy and
the US) even when we allow for a 1% reduction in the average payroll tax rate holding
constant the total tax revenues. The required increase in the average personal income tax
rate results to be equal to 0.90% and 0.10% for Italy and the US respectively. As expected,
given the non-linear structure of the two taxation systems, these values di¤er from 1%.
23On the basis of this, the labour economists’ common view seems to be right.
Another extention of the model might consider if this result is robust to a
industry level wage determination where the monopolistic union can not in-
ternalise all the macroeconomic e¤ects but where the Nash equilibrium is
not longer the equilibrium solution. However, our policy experiments …nd
also some evidence in favour of the Daveri and Tabellini’s (2000) hypothesis
according to which an economy’s poor employment performance can be re-
lated to labour taxation. In particular, a 1% decrease in the average personal
income and payroll tax rates has a relevant impact on employment (namely,
0.43% and 0.83%, respectively, for Italy; 0.60% and 0.57%, respectively, for
the US). These e¤ects are strongly related to the interest rate mechanism and
to the initial taxation level. Furthermore, in contrast to a linear taxation sys-
tem, a nonlinear taxation system allows for the possibility that the e¤ects
of counterbalancing tax changes do not cancel out and may in‡uence em-
ployment equilibrium. Taking as a benchmark for our policy experiment the
actual …scal reform during the period 1978-97, variations in the employment
rate implied by our model are quite close to those empirically observed.
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E®ects of Changes in Marginal Personal Income Tax Rate
Italy
%¿ %º¤ %w %n %M %h %c %s %r %g
-1 0.39 -0.10 0.13 0.05 0.16 0.07 0.06 0.18 0.40
-2.5 0.97 -0.24 0.29 0.14 0.39 0.18 0.16 0.43 0.94
-5 1.94 -0.50 0.64 0.27 0.77 0.35 0.32 0.90 1.99
-7.5 2.91 -0.74 0.95 0.40 1.15 0.52 0.47 1.34 2.96
USA
%¿ %º¤ %w %n %M %h %c %s %r %g
-1 0.51 -0.14 0.22 0.07 0.21 0.09 0.09 0.29 0.70
-2.5 1.28 -0.35 0.55 0.16 0.51 0.23 0.21 0.71 1.75
-5 2.57 -0.69 1.09 0.33 1.02 0.47 0.43 1.41 3.47
-7.5 3.85 -1.02 1.62 0.49 1.53 0.71 0.64 2.11 5.16
Table A2
Effects of Changes Average Personal Income Tax Rate
Italy
%t %º¤ %w %n %M %h %c %s %r %g %y
-1 -0.17 -0.13 0.43 -0.02 -0.07 0.04 0.03 0.23 0.59 0.03
-2.5 -0.43 -0.32 1.07 -0.06 -0.18 0.09 0.07 0.57 1.48 0.08
-5 -0.87 -0.63 2.14 -0.12 -0.35 0.18 0.14 1.14 2.97 0.17
-7.5 -1.29 -0.94 3.22 -0.17 -0.53 0.27 0.21 1.71 4.45 0.25
USA
%t %º¤ %w %n %M %h %c %s %r %g %y
-1 -0.24 -0.17 0.60 -0.03 -0.10 -0.52 -0.53 0.35 0.94 -0.53
-2.5 -0.60 -0.43 1.54 -0.07 -0.25 -0.45 -0.47 0.88 2.43 -0.46
-5 -1.20 -0.85 3.11 -0.14 -0.49 -0.32 -0.38 1.76 4.91 -0.34
-7.5 -1.78 -1.27 4.69 -0.21 -0.73 -0.20 -0.28 2.64 7.39 -0.22
1 0.24 0.17 -0.60 0.03 0.10 -0.62 -0.61 -0.35 -1.04 -0.62
2.5 0.61 0.43 -1.54 0.07 0.25 -0.69 -0.67 -0.88 -2.53 -0.69
5 1.22 0.85 -3.11 0.14 0.49 -0.82 -0.77 -1.75 -5.00 -0.80
7.5 1.85 1.27 -4.69 0.21 0.73 -0.94 -0.86 -2.62 -7.47 -0.92
28Figure A2
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Effects of Changes Marginal Payroll Tax Rate
Italy
%± %º¤ %w %n %M %h %c %s %r %g %y
-1% 0.32 -0.01 0.02 -0.005 0.0005 -0.003 -0.003 0.01 0.04 -0.003
-2.5% 0.81 -0.02 0.04 -0.014 0.0013 -0.007 -0.008 0.03 0.09 -0.01
-5% 1.64 -0.03 0.08 -0.027 0.0027 -0.014 -0.016 0.05 0.18 -0.02
-7.5% 2.48 -0.05 0.12 -0.042 0.0041 -0.021 -0.024 0.08 0.27 -0.02
USA
%± %º¤ %w %n %M %h %c %s %r %g %y
-1% 0.07 -0.003 -0.01 -0.003 0.0003 -0.573 -0.573 0.01 -0.03 -0.57
-2.5% 0.18 -0.009 0.01 -0.008 0.0008 -0.575 -0.576 0.02 0.01 -0.58
-5% 0.36 -0.017 0.03 -0.016 0.0016 -0.579 -0.58 0.04 0.07 -0.58
-7.5% 0.54 -0.026 0.06 -0.024 0.0024 -0.584 -0.585 0.05 0.14 -0.58
1 -0.07 0.003 -0.01 0.003 -0.0003 -0.569 -0.569 -0.01 -0.08 -0.57
2.5 -0.18 0.009 -0.01 0.008 -0.0008 -0.567 -0.566 -0.02 -0.12 -0.57
5 -0.36 0.017 -0.03 0.018 -0.0016 -0.562 -0.561 -0.04 -0.18 -0.56
7.5 -0.53 0.026 -0.06 0.024 -0.0024 -0.558 -0.557 -0.05 -0.24 -0.56
Table A4
Effects of Changes Average Payroll Tax Rate
Italy
%d %º¤ %w %n %M %h %c %s %r %g %y
-1% -0.31 0.01 0.83 0.01 -0.002 0.12 0.10 0.53 1.33 0.11
-2.5% -0.76 0.02 2.11 0.02 -0.006 0.30 0.26 1.34 3.33 0.29
-5% -1.53 0.04 4.27 0.03 -0.011 0.62 0.52 2.71 6.74 0.59
-7.5% -2.29 0.07 6.50 0.05 -0.017 0.94 0.79 4.11 10.2 0.89
USA
%d %º¤ %w %n %M %h %c %s %r %g %y
-1% -0.20 0.01 0.57 0.01 -0.002 -0.49 -0.50 0.39 1.00 -0.49
-2.5% -0.51 0.03 1.46 0.03 -0.005 -0.36 -0.39 0.98 2.58 -0.37
-5% -1.02 0.06 2.96 0.05 -0.010 -0.15 -0.20 1.98 5.26 -0.16
-7.5% -1.54 0.09 4.50 0.08 -0.015 0.07 -0.01 3.00 7.97 0.05
1 0.20 -0.01 -0.57 -0.01 0.002 -0.65 -0.64 -0.39 -1.10 -0.65
2.5 0.51 -0.03 -1.46 -0.03 0.005 -0.78 -0.75 -0.97 -2.65 -0.77
5 1.02 -0.06 -2.96 -0.05 0.010 -0.98 -0.92 -1.92 -5.22 -0.96
7.5 1.54 -0.09 -4.50 -0.08 0.015 -1.18 -1.09 -2.86 -7.74 -1.15
31Figure A4
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